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Since I began circulating drafts of an article arguing that certain law school officials have
exposed themselves to professional discipline by engaging in dishonest marketing tactics,
1

responses have varied considerably. Everyone seems to agree, however, that law school

officials should not lie in their pursuit of students. There also appears to be broad consensus that
misleading (albeit not intentionally false) marketing—such as systematically skewed salary
statistics—is an unfortunate phenomenon, although disagreement remains on just how serious a
problem it is and what level of corrective effort is appropriate. In their recently-published
response pieces, Kyle McEntee of Law School Transparency (“LST”) and Professor Jeffrey
Stake offer two new avenues for improving the accuracy of law school marketing. Stake
explains a theory under which law schools could be held liable for publishing inaccurate
information through lawsuits filed by students who—but for the inaccuracies—would have either
spent less on their legal education or avoided law school entirely.2 If successful, such lawsuits
would both provide justice to misled tuition payers and deter future misconduct by law schools.
McEntee proposes a certification program under which LST would verify the accuracy of law
school marketing materials, allowing schools to advertise that their numbers have been blessed
by third-party auditors.3
I will begin my reply with a free suggestion to would-be plaintiffs encouraged by
Professor Stake’s legal theory. Hurry. You will certainly feel foolish if your rankings fraud suit
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is dismissed because of a statute of limitations.4 With respect to the merits of the theory, I am
especially intrigued by the idea of plaintiffs who turned down scholarship money offered by a
lower-ranked school so they could attend a higher-ranked school.5 These potential plaintiffs
could avoid one problem facing the actual plaintiffs who have sued various law schools, the
highly speculative nature of their alleged damages. For the actual plaintiffs, the complaint boils
down to something like the following: (1) I was not sure if I should attend law school, and in the
event I decided to attend, I was not sure about what law school to attend. (2) Relying upon
certain representations, I matriculated at Defendant Law School (“DLS”). (3) I later learned that
these representations were false. The rest is commentary.6 A big problem with this theory of
liability is that even if one accepts the plaintiff’s claims at face value, one can dispute whether
attending DLS actually harmed the plaintiff. Just how terrible is the plaintiff’s post-law school
life? Is she malingering, or is she working as hard as possible to find well-paying work? Will
her law degree prove valuable one day, or is it worthless? Would her life have turned out
differently if she had attended some other law school, or is she so incompetent that even with a
Yale Law School degree she would be jobless?7 And if she had skipped law school, what would
she have tried instead, and how would she have fared? Lawyers for various DLSs have so far
mostly avoided reaching this stage of analysis by winning at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Supporters of these suits should realize, however, that if judges allow law school alumni lawsuits
to proceed, and if juries then find the defendant law schools liable, the plaintiffs face real
challenges at the damages stage.
Not so with Professor Stake’s potential plaintiffs, whose complaints can be summarized
as follows: (1) I was admitted both to Truth-Telling Law School (“TTLS”) and to Defendant
Law School (“DLS”). (2) I considered attending TTLS because it would have cost me less
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money than attending DLS, where I ultimately did matriculate. (3) I chose to pay more at DLS
because that school was ranked above TTLS. (4) As it turns out, DLS was ranked above TTLS
in part because of its fraudulent publication of false information.8

Here, if one accepts a

plaintiff’s premises, calculating damages is simple. The defendant owes the extra money the
plaintiff spent to attend DLS instead of TTLS,9 a figure one can calculate after consulting the
nominal tuition and fees charged by each school along with the scholarship offers, if any,
presented to the plaintiff.10
Further, compared to the actual plaintiffs law schools have faced so far, Professor Stake’s
potential plaintiffs should have an easy time proving reliance. The actual plaintiffs have faced
the tricky task of convincing courts that they truly read law school employment statistics and that
the statistics genuinely affected the plaintiffs’ decisions to enroll. Even the most honest plaintiff
must overcome the suspicion that his memory is colored by bias; his incentive to recall himself
relying on rosy statistics is immense. And even if a court assumes reliance when considering a
motion to dismiss, the judge can deem the reliance unreasonable, as some plaintiffs have
learned.11

But under the new rankings fraud theory, allegations of reliance become quite

credible. Indeed, it would be difficult to overstate the importance of law school rankings to
prospective students.
With the next set of Professor Stake’s potential plaintiffs, those who would not have
attended law school at all but for misleading employment statistics,12 the difficulty of calculating
damages returns with full force. Like the actual law graduate plaintiffs, this class of hypothetical
litigants must somehow prove that their law school educations were not worth their price.13 The
value of a law school degree is the subject of some controversy. I have read serious suggestions
that for some alumni, law degrees have negative economic value; they not only failed to provide
24
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legal jobs but also hinder the search for non-legal employment. On the other hand, two scholars
suggest in a forthcoming paper that the median value of a law degree is around $1 million.14 For
now at least, I will stay out of the law degree valuation debate, other than to note the tremendous
uncertainty surrounding any projection about the economic value of a course of study,
particularly decades into the future.15 In addition, even if economists can offer a fair estimate of
the median value of a law degree (that is, the median lifetime earning premium obtained by
attending law school, compared to a similarly situated college graduate who does not), real
lawsuits require the calculation of damages suffered by a specific person, whose life outcomes
may not resemble projected medians.16
In any event, I am pleased to have Prof. Stake on board the anti-dishonesty bandwagon,
and I appreciate his plain statement that “the lying in which law schools have engaged is plainly
deplorable behavior deserving severe punishment.”17 Further, while he raises a few concerns
about potential problems associated with subjecting law school officials to professional
discipline for dishonest marketing (for example, someone who participated in dishonesty might
be discouraged from blowing the whistle by fears of personal punishment),18 he does not dispute
my conclusion that dishonest law school marketing—if committed by lawyers—can violate
existing regulations governing lawyers and can accordingly justify professional sanctions.19
McEntee agrees that professional discipline is appropriate.20
So far, I have yet to see anyone respond to my article by arguing something to the effect
of: “Under current law governing lawyers, a law school dean may brazenly lie to prospective
students about matters material to their choice of where (and whether) to matriculate without fear
of professional sanctions.” The closest I have seen might be this comment of Prof. Andrew
Perlman:
25
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I’m also a little bit concerned about interpreting Rule 8.4(c) as expansively as
[Trachtenberg] suggests. If a lawyer could be disciplined for making misleading
statements on matters of public import, I wonder how many politicians (many of
whom are lawyers) would be subject to disciplinary proceedings under this
understanding of Rule 8.4(c)?21
I think, however, that important distinctions can be made between dishonest law school
marketing and dishonest political speech. First, the very term “political speech” signals the
important First Amendment concerns that would be presented should bar counsel seek to punish
a politician who, say, falsely accused an opponent of cutting Medicare benefits. Second, even I
would not recommend applying Rule 8.4(c) to the kind of nonfalsifiable puffery common in
educational marketing. Claims like “students receive useful hands-on practice experience in our
clinics” ought to be beyond the scope of “dishonesty” charges—unless, of course, such
statements were uttered concerning a school with no clinics at all. The misrepresentation and
deceit that I believe worthy of bar counsel’s attention is quite different from statements like “we
have a collegial environment.”22
Recall that my article begins with stories of two American law schools whose officials
engaged in knowing deceit—for years—about the credentials of their incoming students (their
standardized test scores and undergraduate grade point averages).23 They intentionally sent this
false information to the American Bar Association, to prospective students, and to U.S. News &
World Report, which used the bogus data to give the schools inflated rankings. As Prof. Stake
has documented (and as is understood intuitively by those who pay attention to law school
admissions), these rankings significantly affected matriculation decisions and likely caused at
least some students to pay tens of thousands of extra tuition dollars to attend the offending
26
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schools. Will anyone state directly that the deans responsible for those falsifications cannot
properly be punished by the bar? Would such punishment really start us down the path to
sanctions against United States Senators who break campaign promises?
If we can accept that brazen falsehoods in the service of “rankings fraud” are properly
punishable, then deciding what other misleading law school marketing can justify bar discipline
becomes an exercise in line drawing. Reasonable minds may differ about just how sloppy a
school’s alumni salary statistics may be before a lawyer responsible for their publication should
be accused of “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” For those who disapprove of
suddenly punishing law school officials for conduct common in legal education, advisory bar
opinions can provide fair notice that certain forms of marketing will no longer be tolerated.
Although much of the response to my article has concerned the propriety of punishment,
McEntee helpfully directs his attention to how we might avoid misleading marketing in the first
place. Yes, punishing wrongdoing deters future misconduct. And formally announcing the
disapproval of the community has its own value.24 But as I mentioned near the end of the article,
constructive solutions will largely help law schools do the right thing instead of reacting to those
that do wrong.25 One’s heart must be truly hardened to prefer that colleagues stray and be
chastised rather than reform and prosper.26
McEntee essentially argues that existing regulatory bodies cannot repair the damage law
schools have inflicted upon their own reputations.27 In particular, he deems the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) slow moving and lacking in credibility. (As an aside, I will note that if
McEntee is correct, then he has severely weakened one of the more plausible arguments against
using bar discipline to curb misleading law school marketing. Prof. Stake, for example, writes
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that “tailoring and clarification of the ABA standards will be more important than increasing the
personal punishment lawyers face for being involved in misreporting.”28 Prof. Perlman predicts
“that the solution is better ABA/AALS standards rather than lawyer discipline.”29
responses lose force if the ABA cannot handle its responsibilities.)

These

McEntee raises fair

criticisms. While the ABA has made recent statements indicating that it takes seriously its role
in the fight against deceptive law school marketing,30 the organization spent years doing little-tonothing about the chicanery now widely understood (at least by those who care about such
things) to have been common practice among American law schools. For example, salary
statistics touted by law schools misstate the economic reality of recent law graduates because of
their tendency to oversample the best paid alumni,31 and ABA action has been anemic.32 Even if
the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar becomes a dynamic force for
accurate marketing of legal education, at least some potential law students may discount the
value of ABA approval, if only because reputations once tarnished are slow to repair.
To supplement the accreditation work of the ABA, McEntee offers the services of Law
School Transparency, of which he is the executive director and a co-founder. Although I cannot
speculate about the value of LST’s inspection program,33 I am pleased to see LST offer some
form of constructive services. It is easy, in a sense, for someone like me to criticize law school
administrators and regulators. After all, I neither run a law school nor regulate those who do,
and I accordingly will not face the challenge of meeting my own proposed standards. In
addition, a prospective law student who reads my article might acquire some appropriate
skepticism concerning statistics presented in law school websites and viewbooks.

That

skepticism, however, does not easily translate into the ability to discern which law schools are
more and less trustworthy. If prospective law students know which schools disseminate shady
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statistics, then those schools should (if my introductory economics instructors told me the truth)
be slapped by the invisible hand. If the wrongdoers can evade detection in a sea of “everyone
does it” cynicism, market discipline will arrive more slowly, if at all.
To help honest schools earn the credit they deserve, LST proposes to review law school
marketing materials and certify their trustworthiness. Perhaps LST would also help law schools
produce accurate marketing materials if hired to do so. While the devil remains in the details, I
commend LST for offering what could be a valuable service, and I wish McEntee and his
colleagues all success. If other organizations can offer competing third-party certification—
ideally without creating so much confusion as to undermine their purpose—so much the better.
Efforts like the proposed LST program will be useful regardless of how the ABA performs. If
the ABA response to misleading marketing remains inadequate, then outside auditors can
concurrently provide well-behaved law schools with a credible seal of approval while also
arming the ABA’s critics with important data. If the ABA performs well, then additional thirdparty certification can offer incentives to schools who wish to attain accuracy above the
regulatory-mandated minimum.
In the end, however, school-selected third-party number crunchers are no substitute for
effective accreditation. Profs. Stake and Perlman are correct that whatever one’s opinion of
using bar discipline to discourage malfeasance by law school officials, an active ABA possesses
tools far better calibrated for quickly influencing the behavior of law schools. When the ABA
tells law schools to jump, they may not ask “how high,” but they eventually get their feet off of
the ground.

Even Prof. Brian Tamanaha, by no means an unquestioning fan of ABA

accreditation standards,34 recognizes their power to effect changes desired by those who draft the
regulations. Any law school dean will tell you that if an ABA site visit report identifies some
29
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apparent shortcoming, a law school is usually better off addressing the problem than arguing.35
As far as I know, however, site visit teams do not include an assessment of law school marketing
in their reports.36 In a world without any intentional falsification in law school marketing, it
would still be useful for ABA reports to advise law schools on how they might better comply
with Standard 509.37 (As a point of comparison, I will note that in one recent ABA report I have
had the chance to review, the site visit team found space to address the rigor with which teachers
enforce attendance requirements, the level of administrative support for the externship program,
the number of academic credits awarded to various journal editors, the number of linear feet of
library shelving, and the square footage of co-curricular activity space. While the report did
mention some areas related to Standard 509, it did not assess the accuracy of the school’s
published employment statistics.)
As it happens, we do not live in a world in which intentionally deceptive law school
marketing is some “scamblog” fantasy. Further, while only a few examples of brazen deceit
have thus far come to light, misleading statistics pervade law school publications. For the ABA
to combat misleading law school marketing with any chance of success, it must envisage itself
more like the Securities and Exchange Commission and less like the Chamber of Commerce.
Both organizations have a place in American economic and political life, but only one is a
regulator.
American legal education enjoys tremendous privilege. The federal government lends
our customers whatever it takes to pay our tuition, along with living expenses, all while asking
pretty much no questions. If the student later cannot pay back the money, that is a problem for
the borrower and the lender; the law school has no skin in the game. Concurrently, many law
schools receive state funding through public university systems, and even nominally private law
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schools benefit from tax law provisions designed to promote education, such as the income tax
deduction for charitable donations and the exemption of schools from local real property taxes.
These legal benefits are not enshrined in the Constitution of the United States. Federal and state
governments have given them to us, largely in the form of legislation, and those governments
can take them away if we exhibit sufficiently bad behavior.
Lawsuits against deceitful law schools may be useful. The same is true of third-party
certification of honest law schools. And bar discipline may too have something to offer, if only a
chance for the legal profession to condemn injustice perpetrated by its own members. Yet
without a good regulator, law schools will continue to mislead consumers, and eventually the
public that so generously funds legal education may run out of patience.

*

Associate Professor, University of Missouri School of Law. I thank Kyle McEntee and Jeff Stake for their
thoughtful responses to my article, as well as the Nebraska Law Review for soliciting and editing their commentary
and my own reply. I also thank Scott Norberg, Andrew Perlman, and others who have taken time to discuss legal
education with me over the past year.
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